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I. Introduction 
 
Following closely my remit, this paper reviews and assesses Asian 
economic development in the recent post-1980 period, as well as 
over the somewhat longer time-span since WWII.  Its chief purpose 
is to draw analytical and policy implications from this experience. 
This is a challenging but pleasant task, since, conceived at least 
in narrow economic terms (growth of per capita incomes), the Asian 
story is generally speaking one of outstanding success.  Indeed, 
it would be no exaggeration to say that post-World War II economic 
expansion in a number of Asian countries are the most successful 
examples of industrialization and fast growth over a sustained 
period in the entire history of mankind.  Recall that Japan in 
1950 produced less than 5 million tonnes of crude steel per annum 
and a little over 30 thousand motor vehicles of all types.  The 
US output of steel at that time was nearly 90 million tonnes and 
it produced about 7 million automobiles per year.  By the mid-1970s 
the Japanese had caught up with the US in the production of steel 
and replaced West Germany as the world's largest exporter of cars. 
By 1980 Japan overtook the US to become the largest producer of 
automobiles in the world. 
 
The Japanese experience has by no means been unique.  It was 
self-consciously emulated by countries like Korea and Taiwan, with 
results that are perhaps even more spectacular.  In 1955, Korea 
was unequivocally industrially backward.  Its net value of 
manufacturing output per head was US$8 compared with US$7 in India 
and US$60 in Mexico.
1
  Since then, Korea has managed to transform 
itself from being largely an agricultural society to the point 
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where it is the second most important country in the world (through 
its firm Samsung) in electronic memory chip (DRAM) technology. 
By the year 2000, the country is expected to become the fourth 
largest car producer in the world.  Nothing could be more 
symptomatic of the changing map of world industry when reversing 
historic roles, a hitherto developing country like Korea becomes 
a chief foreign direct investor in the heart of the industrial 
West, i.e. the UK.
2
 
 
The 1980s have been rightly termed the "lost decade" for countries 
on the other two developing continents, i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Latin America.  However, notwithstanding this enormous 
setback to development on these two continents, as well as slower 
economic growth in the world as a whole, the Asian 
industrialization and catch-up drive has continued unabated in 
the 1980s and into the 1990s.  As we shall see below, economic 
expansion in Asia during this period has not just been confined 
to a few countries, but has been widespread.  It has involved 
rising standards of living for billions of people, much of the 
human population. 
 
Understanding and making analytical sense of this extraordinary 
Asian drama is indeed a heartening but rather vast task.  There 
is also no consensus on what are the right lessons to be learnt 
from the East or South East Asian experience, let alone on whether 
or not these lessons are applicable elsewhere in the new conditions 
of the liberal and globalized world economy.  Therefore, to keep 
this paper in manageable limits, its analytical part will be 
confined to an examination of a small number of relevant issues. 
 
Specifically, the paper will concentrate on the extraordinarily 
high rates of savings and investment, particularly those of the 
private corporate sector, of these highly successful Asian 
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 The Korean giant LG Group recently decided to install a factory 
in Wales and invest US$2.6 billion.  This is apparently the largest single 
investment in the European Union from outside the member states.  (See 
further, The Economist, p.24, July 13, 1996.) 
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economies.  In fact, the corporation itself and the relationship 
between the corporation and the government will receive special 
analytical attention.   
 
These emphases on the corporation, savings and investment, it will 
be argued, are not only more significant for the emerging 
post-Uruguay Round global economic order, but they also provide 
the microeconomic dimension which is normally missing from the 
vast literature in this field.  Such emphases are also more 
directly relevant for any lessons that might be drawn for the Latin 
American economies. 
 
However, before the paper proceeds to an analysis of the above 
issues, the next section will set out in quantitative terms the 
main features of Asian economic development in a comparative 
international perspective.  Section III will outline the more 
important analytical and policy questions raised by this record, 
of which only a small subset will be closely examined in the 
sections that follow. 
 
 
II.  Asian economic development in a comparative international 
context 
 
Some important features of Asian economic development over the 
last three decades or so are summarised in tables 1 to 6.  The 
following points which emerge from these tables as well from other 
available information (not reproduced here) deserve attention. 
 
 
1.  As table 1 indicates, in the last fifteen years, developing 
East Asia has been by far the most dynamic region of the world 
economy.  Although the East Asian economies were growing very fast 
even in the previous fifteen years (1965-1980), the gap between 
their growth rates and those of other developing regions, such 
as Latin America, was relatively small (7.3% vs. 6% for Latin 
America).  However, in the 1980s, economic growth collapsed in 
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Latin America (from 6% per annum to 1.6% per annum) while there 
was a trend increase in East Asian economic growth to 7.8% per 
annum. 
 
2.  Disaggregated data by sector (table 1) suggests that it was 
not poor agricultural but rather the abysmal industrial 
performance which was responsible for the collapse of economic 
growth in Latin America in the 1980s.  Nevertheless, East Asia 
did record particularly strong agricultural growth during that 
decade.  
 
3.  In reflecting on East Asian economic expansion, the Chinese 
economy, because of the size of the country's population, deserves 
special consideration.  As disaggregated data for individual 
countries in table 3 shows, the Chinese economy expanded at a rate 
of nearly 10% per annum in the 1980s, a shade below the Korean 
pace.  In the 1990s, the Chinese growth rate has been even faster 
and somewhat greater than Korea's.  However, the important point 
is that when a South Korea grows at 10% a year for fifteen years, 
this is an extraordinary achievement for the world to take note. 
 However, when China with a billion people achieves a similar 
growth rate, this is not just extraordinary, but an epoch-making 
event. 
 
4.  Turning to the other main populous country, India, its 
performance until 1980 was relatively poor by international 
standards.  However, since then there has been a marked 
improvement.  During the 1980s, India was one of the few countries 
in the world to have achieved a significant trend increase in its 
growth rate.  While table 3 indicates some subsequent 
deterioration in performance between 1990 and 1994, if the 1995 
data is included - when the economy grew at 7% a year and industry 
for the first time achieved growth rates similar to those seen 
in the East Asian NICs - the overall picture for the 1990s becomes 
more positive. 
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5.  Apart from the important differences in the pace of economic 
development of the East Asian and South Asian countries like India, 
it is customary and analytically useful to distinguish between 
two groups of countries within East Asia - specifically between 
North East (Japan, Korea and Taiwan
3
) and South East (Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia
4
) Asian countries.  The latter group of 
countries have followed rather different economic policies to 
those in North East Asian nations but have been just as successful 
during the last decade. 
 
However, in this context UNCTAD (1996) observes that although the 
recent economic record of these two groups is indeed similar, 
taking a longer perspective reveals a significant performance gap 
between the groups.  The exact result will depend on which periods 
and which countries have been considered, but the annual per capita 
GDP growth rates of Japan and the first-tier NICs have, on average, 
been roughly 2 percentage points higher than those of the 
second-tier NICs over the last three decades or so.  The cumulative 
impact of this growth gap over 30 years is significant.  For 
example, Malaysia's per capita income in 1961 was almost three 
times that of Korea's and almost twice that of Taiwan, (Malaysia 
then included Singapore, so purely "Malaysian" income would have 
been somewhat lower).  It remained higher than the Korean per 
capita income until 1981, but in 1993 was less than half that of 
Korea, and about one-third that of Taiwan.
5
 
 
6.  The Asian countries excellent record of economic growth during 
the last fifteen years has certainly translated into impressive 
increases in the average standards of living of the population, 
reductions in poverty, increasing real wages and rising 
employment. 
 
                     
    
3
 Korea and Taiwan are also referred to as the "first-tier" NICs 
    
4
 These are also referred to as "second-tier" NICs 
    
5
 See further UNCTAD (1996), page 13. 
  
 
 6 
(a)Adjustment to GDP growth rate figures in table 1 for the rates 
of growth of population, terms of trade and net factor 
payments abroad, suggest that during the 1980s average 
per capita income in Asian countries rose by fifty 
percent.  This compares with a decline of 15 percent 
in Latin America and 25 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(UN, 1990). 
 
(b)ILO (1995) provides evidence that in the 1980s, in the 
fast-growing East and South East Asian economies such 
as Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia, labour 
shortages emerged and there was significant immigration 
of labour from neighbouring low-income countries.  
Manufacturing employment rose at a rate of over 6 percent 
per annum during this decade in these dynamic economies 
whilst, at the same time, real earnings increased at 
an average rate of 5 percent per annum. 
 
(c)With respect to poverty, available evidence for the 1980s for 
individual fast-growing NICs, suggests sizeable 
reductions in its incidence. Thus in China the incidence 
of absolute poverty fell from 28 percent of the 
population in 1980 to 10 percent in 1990; in Indonesia 
the corresponding reduction was from 29 to 15 percent; 
in the Republic of Korea from 10 to 5 percent, and in 
Malaysia from 9 to 2 percent.   
 
(d)A remarkable feature of East and South East Asian development 
during the relevant period has been that not only has 
the rate of growth been very high, but income 
distribution has become more rather than less equal. 
World Bank (1993) notes "For the eight HPAEs, rapid 
growth and declining inequality have been shared 
virtues, as comparisons over time of equality and growth 
using Gini coefficients illustrate".
6
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 It will be argued below that this conclusion of declining 
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The above positive East Asian record stands in striking  contrast 
to that of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa in the recent 
period. ILO (1995) reports that in Latin America between 1980 and 
1992, there was a steady fall in modern sector employment, with 
paid employment falling at a rate of 0.1 percent per annum during 
the 1980s. This reversed the trend of the previous three decades 
when steady economic growth had led to a significant expansion 
of modern-sector employment. In most Latin American countries, 
the average real wage fell during the 1980s, recovering in only 
a few countries towards the end of the decade. Minimum wage fell 
on average by 24 percent in real terms across the region, while 
average earnings in the informal sector declined by 42 percent.  
 
 
III.  Analytical and policy issues 
 
The central analytical and policy question raised by East Asian 
economic experience is of course, what are the causes of the fast 
economic growth in these countries?  
 
There is no agreement on this question. Indeed, there is a 
continuing controversy in which the main protagonists are the World 
Bank with some orthodox economists on one side and a number of 
academic economists, not all of whom are heterodox, on the other.
7
 
This debate is important for two reasons.  Firstly, the World Bank 
professes to base its policy recommendations for countries around 
the globe on what it regards as the lessons to be drawn from the 
experience of these highly successful East Asian countries.  
Secondly, from an analytical point of view, the debate is clearly 
of central importance, precisely because of the fast growth of 
these economies over a sustained period.  Thus, the resolution 
of this debate would inevitably have an important bearing on our 
                                                                
inequality may require some important qualifications. 
    
7
 See World Bank (1991, 1993); Amsden (1994a); Fishlow et al (1994); 
Ito and Krueger (1995); Singh (1994b, 1995a). 
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general ideas on growth and development. 
 
With the publication of World Bank (1993), Singh (1994b) notes 
that there has been some useful narrowing of differences between 
the two sides, but there remains a wide gulf on a range of 
significant issues. These have been reviewed and commented on in 
Singh (1995a). The more important ones are: 
 
(i)   the question of the effectiveness of industrial policy; 
 
(ii) the issue of "openness": how open were the East Asian  
economies during their periods of fast growth? 
 
(iii) the nature of competition in domestic product and capital 
 markets; 
 
(iv)  the role of savings and investment in East Asian economic 
 growth; 
 
(v)   the question why the Asian countries did not have a debt 
 crisis while the Latin Americans did; 
 
(vi) the relationship between technology policy, industrial   
policy and international competitiveness; 
 
(vii) the relationship between the "fundamentals", macroeconomic 
 stability and industrial policy. 
 
An analysis and resolution of these issues will determine what 
are the right lessons to be learned from the East Asian economic 
model or models. However, the economic record of these countries 
also raises other significant issues which are listed below. 
 
Firstly, can the Asian experience be replicated? Apart from 
anything else, it is suggested that the international economic 
environment is totally different to-day from that in which the 
East Asian NICs achieved their formidable success.  For example, 
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in the post-Uruguay round emerging world trading order, many of 
the interventionist industrial and commercial policy instruments 
used by Japan, Korea and other countries will no longer be 
permissible.
8
 
 
Secondly, is fast East Asian economic growth sustainable in the 
direct, narrow sense of the term? The subject draws its 
significance from the following considerations: (a) the slow-down 
in the Japanese economy in the 1990s which may be expected to have 
adverse effects on economic growth in other countries in the 
region; (b) secondly, the large current account deficits of the 
second-tier NICs and hence their vulnerability to capital 
outflows. It will be recalled that prior to 1980, countries like 
Brazil had been growing fast for a considerable period. Then 
suddenly Brazil, Mexico and the rest of the Latin America stumbled 
into a decade long crisis.  In the current situation, given their 
present vulnerability to surges of capital flows, what is there 
to stop a similar fate being visited on the South East Asian NICs? 
 
Thirdly, an alternative view to that above is that there now exists 
among the East and South East Asian countries a large degree of 
economic co-operation.  This has fostered a regional dynamic which 
has acquired an autonomy of its own. These factors, it is suggested, 
would allow these countries to sustain high rates of economic 
growth regardless of the state of the world economy including that 
of Japan. Indeed, some would argue that currency appreciation and 
slower economic growth in Japan help developing East Asian 
countries positively by leading to greater Japanese FDI in these 
countries.
9
 
 
Fourthly, there are special analytical issues raised by the 
epoch-making Chinese record. Specifically, if freely functioning 
internal and external markets are essential for economic growth 
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 See further Singh (1996a); ODI (1995); UNCTAD (1995); Greenaway 
and Milner (1995); Agosin, Tussie and Crespi (1995). 
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as the Bretton Woods Institutions routinely insist, how have the 
Chinese been able to grow so fast with such low levels of 
development of capital and labour markets and highly segmented 
product markets?  Similarly, the Chinese experience raises the 
important question whether privatisation of the means of 
production is at all necessary for adequate (from the perspective 
of achieving fast economic growth) development of markets to 
occur.
10
 
 
These are all large questions and cannot be properly treated within 
the confines of this paper. The rest of the paper therefore limits 
itself to only one of the main themes above, namely, what are the 
right lessons from the Asian experience. But even within that 
context, the paper considers just one of the main issues, that 
of savings and investment. How have the East Asian economies been 
able to achieve such high rates of savings and investments, 
particularly in the private corporate sector. This involves inter 
alia an analysis of the relationship between the government, the 
corporation and the financial system in these exemplar economies. 
 
This analysis therefore departs from the old debate about 
industrial policy and getting prices "right" or "wrong". It 
hopefully will shed some useful light on an important dynamic 
aspect of the East Asian experience and may also have implications 
for Latin American countries which are afflicted with the problem 
of low savings and investment rates.  
 
IV.  Savings, investment and total factor productivity growth in 
East Asia. 
 
The successful East Asian countries are characterised by high rates 
of savings and investments.  This was, however, not always the 
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 For the view of the Bretton Woods Institutions on the necessity 
of free and flexible markets for fostering economic growth, the classic 
statement is World Bank (1991).  For the difficultuies that the Chinese 
experience over the last 15 years creates for this thesis, see Singh 
(1994a, 1996e). 
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case.  For example, UNCTAD (1994) notes with respect to Japan that 
gross domestic fixed capital formation in that country increased 
from 24 percent of GNP in the early 1950s to almost 40 percent 
in the 1960s.  The ratio of private equipment investment to GNP 
doubled between the early 1950s and the late 1960s, reaching 17 
percent. Similarly, in Korea, gross domestic fixed investment as 
a proportion of GDP rose from less than 10 percent in the mid-1950s 
to about 25 percent in the mid-1970s , and to over 30 percent by 
the mid-1980s.
11
 In terms of purchasing power parity 
Summers-Heston data, Young (1994) estimates that between 1960 and 
1980, gross fixed investment to GDP ratio doubled in Taiwan, 
tripled in Korea and quadrupled in Singapore. 
 
It is also to Young's (1994) credit to have established the primacy 
of the accumulation process in `causing' (in growth accounting 
terms) fast economic growth in the East Asian countries.  His 
studies as well as those by Lau and Kim (1994) show that the record 
of leading East Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan 
with respect to TFP growth is far from being outstanding.  Both 
South Korea and Taiwan achieved a lower TFP growth than Bangladesh 
over the period 1970-85.  What this suggests is that the proximate 
cause of fast economic growth in the leading East Asian countries 
is their very fast expansion of factor inputs including physical 
and human capital rather than "technical progress". 
 
How were these high rates of investment and savings achieved?  
There is a simple neoclassical story which ascribes East Asia's 
unusually high rates of savings and investment basically to sound 
'fundamentals'. Specifically, it is suggested that prudent 
macroeconomic management, consequent low rates of inflation  and 
low exchange rate fluctuations, coupled with good initial 
conditions (land reform, and hence relatively equal distribution 
of income and wealth,  favourable human capital endowment due to 
universal primary education) led to fast growth of household 
incomes and savings. In this account, some countries were subject 
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initially to financial repression (eg. Korea in the mid-1960s). 
But once this was eliminated and real interest rates became 
positive, household savings rose further, as did investment. 
 
The World Bank (1993) represents a considerable advance on this 
orthodox story. In response to the criticisms of the neoclassical 
analysis, it accepts that fast growing East Asian countries did 
not eliminate financial repression. It also acknowledges that 
governments in these countries adopted a host of measures to raise 
both the levels of savings and investment, as well as to influence 
the allocation of investments. It is, however, argued that the 
financial repression practised in these countries was relatively 
mild and that this did not adversely affect savings. 
 
Following Akyuz and Gore (1996) and Singh (1996b) the analysis 
below presents a more complex view of the accumulation process 
in East Asia.  This view stresses the central role of profits in 
providing both the inducement to invest and the means to pay for 
investment. Profits are also of course a consequence of investment. 
This investment-profitability nexus was not, however, a 
spontaneous outcome of the invisible hand of the market but rather, 
the government policy measures and the government-business 
interactions were central to generating and sustaining it. At the 
aggregate level the net result was greatly increased propensities 
to save and invest and the ex-ante equality of savings and 
investment at high rates of economic growth.  
 
This conceptualisation of the East Asian experience is in the 
classical tradition and also suggests that high rates of investment 
lead to faster technical progress, greater learning by doing, and 
through cumulative causation, to a virtuous circle of greater 
competitiveness and faster economic growth.
12
  So in this analysis 
the emphasis is on the dynamics of the accumulation process 
(mediated through high profits) the associated technical change 
and the growth of productivity rather than on static resource 
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allocation and getting prices right or wrong.  The argument is 
illustrated below by considering the case of Japan and South Korea. 
 
 
V.  Investment, profits and savings in Japan in the high growth 
period (1950-1973)13 
 
As seen before, in the early 1950s, the Japanese level of 
industrialisation was not all that different from that of today's 
semi-industrial countries.  Indeed in 1952 the value of Japanese 
exports was lower than that of India's (Krueger, 1995).  However, 
as a consequence of the extraordinary economic growth in the 1950s 
and 1960s - when Japanese industrial production expanded at the 
phenomenal rate of about 13 percent per annum, GDP at 10 percent 
per annum and its share in world exports of manufacture rose by 
a huge 10 percentage points - by the early 1970s, Japan had 
graduated to the status of an OECD country.  The Japanese 
experience since 1973, although it still has implications for 
developing countries, is not as directly significant as the earlier 
period. 
 
Table 7 and 8 provide comparative information on investment rates, 
savings rates and profits for Japan and other industrial 
countries.
14
  Table 7 shows that even excluding residential 
construction, Japan was investing more than a quarter of its GDP 
on average in the two decades 1953-72.  Table 8 indicates that 
the average savings propensities of household, business as well 
as government sectors in Japan were higher by a considerable margin 
than those in other countries. 
 
Table 9 suggests that at the macroeconomic level Japan had a much 
higher share of profits in national income as well as considerably 
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  The analysis of this and the following section is based on Singh 
(1996b). 
    
14
  Comparable data is more easily available for other industrial 
than for developing  countries.  
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higher profit rates than other industrial countries in the period 
under consideration.  In 1970, gross profits constituted more than 
half of gross value added in Japan compared with less than a quarter 
in the UK and USA and about a third in countries like Germany and 
Italy. 
 
These high Japanese profit rates arose in important part from heavy 
state intervention which guided the Japanese economy during this 
period. The government had two main proximate objectives:  to 
attain a current account equilibrium at as high a growth rate as 
possible; to increase the private sector's propensities to invest 
and save so as to substantially raise the long term growth rate 
of the economy. The Japanese government sought to achieve the above 
objectives by building up the strength and capabilities of its 
corporations so that these could compete with their counterparts 
from advanced countries in the international market place.  For 
this purpose a number of measures were taken which directly helped 
increase the resources available for corporate investment. These 
were coupled with a range of indirect policies which affected 
positively the external environment of the corporate sector and 
thereby also helped raise profits. Some of these measures are 
briefly outlined below. 
 
 
V.1 Direct policy instruments 
 
These comprised, among other things, a wide variety of fiscal 
incentives to promote corporate growth.  Initially, in the early 
1950s, the fiscal incentives included accelerated depreciation 
for important industrial equipment, a special deduction for export 
earnings, a tax free reserve for losses from export transactions, 
and reduced tax rates on interest and dividends.  Over the next 
two decades, an extraordinary range of other tax concessions were 
added to this list.  To illustrate, there were more than twenty 
five tax free reserves which were available to corporations by 
1975 including:  reserves for bad debt, reserves for loss on 
returned goods unsold, bonus reserve, reserve for retirement 
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allowances, reserve for special repairs, etc.
15
 
 
 
V.2.  Indirect policy instruments 
 
V.2.a. Domestic competition16 
 
Corporate profits were also enhanced by restrictions on domestic 
competition which prevailed in the Japanese product markets.  To 
promote investment and technical change, instead of permitting 
unfettered competition, the Japanese government controlled and 
guided domestic competition in the relevant period in a purposeful 
manner. Competition in Japan has both been encouraged, but notably 
also restricted in a number of ways.  This has been particularly 
true during the years of rapid growth, 1950 - 1973.  The agency 
primarily responsible for the antitrust enforcement in Japan is 
the Fair Trade Commission.  However, in the Japanese scheme of 
government it has much less power compared with MITI which is 
responsible for the country's industrial policy.  Although the 
FTC has never been entirely toothless and antitrust-enforcement 
 in Japan is not a totally meaningless charade, most scholars agree 
that in any conflict between the two agencies' objectives (e.g. 
over the promotion of large scale firms or price fixing 
arrangements during a business cycle downturn), it is MITI and 
its industrial policy which by and large have prevailed over the 
FTC and the competition policy. 
 
To illustrate, it is useful to reflect on some of the blatant 
restrictions which were imposed by the Japanese Government in the 
1950s and 1960s on domestic product market competition. To meet 
its myriad goals which continually changed in the light of economic 
circumstances facing the country, MITI encouraged a variety of 
                     
    15 See Tsuru (1993). For studies of the effects of these fiscal 
measures see Ackley and Ishi (1976); Pechman and Kaizuka (1976). 
    
16
  The following analysis is based on Amsden and Singh (1994) to 
which the reader is referred for a fuller discussion. 
  
 
 16 
cartel arrangements in a wide range of industries ─ export and 
import cartels, cartels to combat depression or excessive 
competition, rationalization cartels, etc.   According to Caves 
and Uekusa (1976), in the 1960s, cartels accounted for 78.1 percent 
of the value of shipments in textiles; 64.8 percent in clothing; 
50.0 percent in non-ferrous metals; 47 percent in printing and 
publishing; 41.2 percent in stone, clay and glass; 34.5 percent 
in steel products, and 37.2 percent in food products.  Although 
these cartels functioned for only limited periods of time and there 
was wide variation in their effectiveness, Caves and Uekusa 
observed that "their mere presence in such broad stretches of the 
manufacturing sector attests to their importance." (page 147). 
 
Similarly, believing that large scale enterprises were required 
for promotion of technical change and for Japanese firms to compete 
effectively with their western counterparts, MITI encouraged 
mergers between leading firms in key industries. The fact that 
the agency did not always succeed in its efforts (notably in the 
car and machine tool industries) does not detract from the 
anti-competitive bias of many of MITI's policies and actions. The 
anti-competitive actions were often re-enforced through MITI's 
use of "administrative guidance" to firms and its discreet 
directions to industry associations with whom it invariably had 
close links. 
 
However, these restraints on competition are only a part of the 
story. An equally significant part of is MITI's strong 
encouragement of vigorous domestic oligopolistic rivalry and 
international competitiveness. In general, whether competition 
was promoted or restricted depended on the industry and its 
life-cycle: in young industries, during the developmental phase, 
the government discouraged competition; when these industries 
became technologically mature, competition was allowed to 
flourish.  Later, when industries are in competitive decline, the 
government again discourages competition and attempts to bring 
about an orderly rationalization of the industry (Okimoto, 1989). 
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V.2.b.  External competition 
 
Protection was of central importance in Japanese industrial 
development during the miracle years.  The trade policy had to 
be complementary to competition policy for otherwise a recession 
cartel, for example, could have been easily overwhelmed by foreign 
imports. Similarly, import restrictions could have overwhelmed 
competition altogether were it not for the performance standards 
that industries receiving protection were forced to meet by the 
government (through, for instance, MITI's control over foreign 
exchange, etc.).
17
  During the 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese 
economy operated under a regime of draconian import controls, 
whether practised formally or informally.  As late as 1978, 
manufactured imports constituted only 2.4% of the Japanese GDP; 
the corresponding proportion in Britain and other countries of 
the EEC was five to six times larger.  Even in the US which 
traditionally, because of its continental size, has a relatively 
closed economy, the volume of imported manufactured goods in the 
late 1970s was proportionally almost twice as large as in Japan 
(Singh, 1995a). 
  
Protection, together with restrictions on domestic competition, 
provided the Japanese companies with a captive home market leading 
to high profits which enabled them to undertake high rates of 
investment, to improve the quality of their products, and also 
to capture markets abroad.  The latter was of particular 
importance to Japanese firms, since in return for protection, MITI 
often imposed on them export and world market share performance 
targets.  Companies recognized that to move forward, to have 
access to foreign technology, licenses etc., they had to export. 
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 To illustrate, Japan's machine tool industry was given selective 
tariff protection specifically for those machine tools with potentially 
high income elasticities of demand and high productivity growth rates. 
But machine tool builders benefiting from protection were required to 
produce at least 50% of their output in the form of computer numerically 
controlled machine tools by a certain date (Amsden and Hikino,1994). 
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 The emphasis on exports and on maintaining oligopolistic rivalry 
- instead of concentrating resources and subsidies on a single 
"national champion", which many governments in their industrial 
policies are prone to do - are the key factors which distinguish 
Japanese policies from those of other dirigiste countries. 
   
 
V.2.c. Low interest rate policy 
 
Another important feature of the external environment faced by 
Japanese firms during this period was the government's low interest 
rate policy.  This policy helped both to increase the resources 
available to firms for investment as well as to enhance their 
willingness to invest.  The government practised "financial 
repression" ie. it kept the interest rate structure more or less 
stable at relatively low levels.  In effect, this amounted to 
credit rationing at the discretion of the Bank of Japan and other 
banks under the so called "window guidance" of the Bank of Japan. 
 Credit rationing and low interest rates were also used to 
subsidise specific industries favoured by the government.  
Leaving aside the problem of credit rationing and interest 
subsidies, the importance of the government's low interest policy 
for highly-geared Japanese corporations cannot be exaggerated. 
However, in macroeconomic terms such a policy can only be sustained 
if there is an adequate supply of savings, an issue taken up below. 
 
 
V.2.d. Administrative guidance and coordination of corporate 
investments 
 
In addition to the policies outlined above which directly or 
indirectly assisted the corporate sector by either increasing 
corporate profits, or by enhancing the internal resources 
available to corporations for investment, the government also used 
other important instruments and policies to guide and help the 
corporate sector. The most significant of these was 
"administrative guidance".  
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This was particularly important during the high growth period as 
what in effect MITI did in that period was to orchestrate investment 
and technology races among oligopolistic firms in favoured 
industries.  Such races needed to be carefully controlled as 
otherwise excess capacity may be created which will adversely 
effect the future corporate inducement to invest.  Scott (1991) 
outlines MITI's characteristic method in relation to the expansion 
of the steel industry in the 1950's: "Japanese firms were required 
to wait their turn to build a new plant while a competitor built 
new capacity and achieved high volumes.  Next time the roles will 
be reversed.  This kind of coordination was carried out under the 
aegis of the government by MITI.  Later the system required the 
scrapping of old capacity as a condition for permission to build 
new.  As a result Japan with a smaller home market than the US 
built 10 plants larger than any in the US (p.54)."
18
 
 
In terms of economic theory, in the context of the real world of 
incomplete markets and ubiquitous potentialities of coordination 
failures, MITI's actions in this sphere amounted to being the 
ringmaster and the referee to ensure coordination of corporate 
investment decisions.  
 
 
V.2.e. Profits and savings 
 
It was seen earlier that not only Japanese aggregate savings ratios 
were high by international standards, each sector of the Japanese 
economy - households, corporations as well as the government - 
saved considerably more than its counterparts in other countries. 
 The high saving propensity of the Japanese corporate sector can 
be attributed to high profits and high inducement to invest.  It 
was also in part due to the particular feature of the Japanese 
financial system which permitted companies to follow a policy of 
low dividend payouts. (See further below) 
                     
    
18
 Quoted in Singh (1995d), p.25. 
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However, Akyuz and Gore (1996) point out that the high savings 
propensity of the Japanese household sector can also be attributed 
in part to high levels of profits in the Japanese economy.  This 
is for two reasons.  First, the household sector includes 
unincorporated enterprises whose savings propensities tend to be 
high and whose incomes depend on profits.  Secondly, bonus 
payments to workers which constituted almost a quarter of their 
annual incomes were also basically a function of profits.  Again, 
the propensity to save out of these bonus payments - which many 
workers particularly during this period regarded as windfall 
payments - is estimated to have been quite high. 
 
There are of course a whole host of other explanations for the 
high savings propensities of the Japanese household sector.  These 
include the fast rate of growth of household incomes, the age and 
employment structures of the population, the lack of publicly 
provided social security.
19
  Low income elasticity of demand for 
foreign goods, the low level of development of financing and credit 
facilities for consumers, formal and informal controls on imports 
of consumer durables can also be expected to have helped played 
a significant part in keeping household consumption low.
20
 
 
 
V.2.f. Corporate rates of return and corporate objectives in Japan 
 
It would appear from the discussion so far that during Japan's 
high growth period, government policies played a key role in 
raising aggregate profits in the economy and in enhancing the 
resources available to corporations for investment.  These high 
profits together with other government policies are seen to have 
contributed significantly to the high savings and investment rates 
                     
    
19
 There is a large literature on the subject of why Japanese savings 
have been so high.  For a recent review see IMF (1995).  See also Maddison 
(1992); Kojima (1995). 
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 See Felix (1994). 
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in the Japanese economy. 
 
This analysis is however, incomplete since the discussion of 
profits in the previous sections has been conducted at a 
macroeconomic level.  A fuller investigation of the subject must 
also consider the magnitude and significance of the corporate 
profit rates at the microeconomic level.  Table 10 presents 
information on corporate profitability and profit margins in 
Japan, U.S. and Germany.  The data indicate that contrary to the 
findings of the national accounts statistics on the aggregate share 
of profits in GDP as well as profit rates on aggregate capital 
stock, both the rates of return and the profit margins of Japanese 
firms have been lower than those of U.S firms.  The observed 
differences in the corporate rates of return in the two countries 
can in principle arise from differences in accounting conventions, 
taxes etc.   However, detailed analysis shows that even allowing 
for these factors, Japanese firms in most industries have lower 
operating margins and returns on assets than the corresponding 
US firms.
21
 
 
That the Japanese rates of return are lower than those of the US 
at the microeconomic level is not necessarily inconsistent with 
the much higher Japanese share of profit in the national income 
relative to the US.  Indeed many economists regard it as a virtue 
of the Japanese financial system which allows Japanese firms to 
continue to survive and to invest even when their rates of return 
are very low.  A lower threshold rate of return allows Japanese 
managers to undertake investments that US firms find unacceptable. 
 To the extent that a higher rate of investment allows faster 
turnover of capital equipment and hence greater technical progress 
and new product development, this give the Japanese firms a 
competitive edge over the American corporations. 
 
                     
    21 See further Blaine (1993). Blaine has carried out a comprehensive 
examination of the financial statement ratios of large firms in 13 major 
industries in the U.S. and Japan over the period 1985-89. 
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The MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity (1989) regarded this 
factor as a major reason why U.S. firms lost out to the Japanese 
corporations in the U.S. home market in a wide range of electronic 
products.  The Commission investigations showed that when a 
Japanese firm entered one of these markets, there was a fall in 
the rate of return of the existing U.S. firms in the industry due 
to greater competition.  This often resulted in the U.S. firms 
leaving that industry fairly quickly and diversifying and 
investing their resources elsewhere since they could not accept 
such low returns.  Japanese companies were however able to sustain 
these low rates of return for long periods. 
 
Survey data on the objectives of Japanese corporate managers 
repeatedly show them to be much more interested in pursuing market 
share than earning a high rate of return on assets or increasing 
the wealth of the shareholders.  Thus for instance, Doyukai's 
(1988) study of Japanese, European and U.S. firms, showed the three 
most important goals for the managers in Japan were improving 
firm's ratios of new products and businesses, followed by gaining 
market share and improving return on investment.  Capital gains 
for shareholders ranked at the bottom of the list and was cited 
by almost none of the sample managers in Japan as an important 
goal for their companies.  In the United States in contrast, by 
far the most important goal was improving return on investment, 
followed by capital gains for shareholders; gaining market share 
was the least significant objective.  European managers showed 
improving return on investment, gaining market share, and 
reformulation of international strategies as three important 
goals. Capital gains for shareholders was placed last on their 
list.
22
  The important question raised by such studies is why are 
Japanese firms able to pay so little attention to share prices 
and rate of return on assets.  To answer this question, it is 
necessary to look at the relationship between the Japanese 
corporation and the financial system. 
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 Doyukai's study which is in Japanese is quoted in Kojima (1995). 
 See also Abegglen and Stalk (1985). 
  
 
 23 
V.2.g. The Corporation and the financial system in Japan 
 
There are two main reasons why the Japanese companies are able 
to pursue goals such as market share and product improvement and 
be much less concerned with share prices and rates of return on 
capital, particularly in the short term.  The first is that the 
Japanese corporations are not subject to the ever present takeover 
threat of the kind which the firms in the U.S. and U.K. have to 
endure. Secondly they have long-term and close relationships (as 
opposed to arms-length dealing) with their "parent" banks. 
 
The reasons behind these reasons lie in the organisation of the 
Japanese corporation and the nature of the financial system. In 
sharp contrast to the situation in the U.S. and the U.K., there 
are hardly any hostile takeovers.  The main reason for this 
phenomenon is the nature of the share ownership in the typical 
large Japanese corporate group.  Generally speaking, three 
quarters of the shares in such a corporation are likely to be held 
by suppliers, customers and the lead bank.  In other words, there 
is a concentration of share ownership in a relatively small number 
of "safe" hands.  Only a quarter of the outstanding shares are 
traded on the market which makes it almost impossible to mount 
a successful hostile takeover.  The independent shareholders are 
obliged to defer to the far larger holdings of the corporation's 
stakeholders.
23
 
 
There is evidence that the Japanese government, after the second 
world war, deliberately instituted a bank-based rather than a stock 
market based system.  Thus for example as Somel (1992) notes, the 
Japanese government prevented the securities market from growing 
by making securities unattractive for ordinary savers, restricted 
residents' and non-residents' access to Japanese securities 
markets and Japanese access to foreign securities markets, and 
provided the finance and funds required by the deficit corporate 
sector through the banking system.  From a sociological 
                     
    23 See further Abegglen and Stalk (1985); Odagiri (1994). 
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perspective, Dore (1985) suggests that in Japan, not only is the 
stock market viewed with suspicion by the general public, it also 
has rather inferior social status. It is the real wealth creating 
corporate sector or the government which attracts the best talent 
rather than the stock market. 
 
Thus a typical large Japanese corporation is much less subject 
to the "short-termism" which is inherent in the Anglo-Saxon stock 
market economies.
24
  The Japanese firm is regulated by internal 
group mechanisms, where the group bank plays a critical role.  
There are sound analytical reasons, as well as empirical evidence 
for the view that this kind of bank-based regulation is more 
conducive to long-term investment not only in plant and equipment, 
but more importantly in training and in firm-specific, often 
intangible, human capital.
25
 
 
To sum up, the low observed corporate rates of return in Japan 
do no contradict the concept of the investment-profits- savings 
nexus. The nature of the Japanese corporation, the characteristic 
features of the country's financial system and the relationship 
between the two help provide a more complete analysis of how the 
nexus operated in Japanese economic development during that 
country's high growth period.   
 
VI.  The government and the corporation in Korea 
 
The Korean story of successful industrialisation in the last three 
decades is intimately linked with the development and the success 
of the giant Korean corporations, the Chaebols.  These are the 
large highly diversified, indeed, "idiosyncratic" conglomerates 
                     
    24 There is a large literature on the stock market and the short termism 
that it typically engenders.  For a recent review, see Singh (1995c). 
 See also Stein (1988, 1989); Cosh, Hughes and Singh (1990); Porter (1992); 
Kojima (1995); Froot, Perold and Stein (1992).  For an opposite point 
of view on the subject see Marsh (1990). 
    
25
 See further Frank and Mayer (1990); Jacobson and Aaker (1993); 
Stiglitz (1993) and Allen and Gale (1995). 
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which have dominated the Korean economy during this period of 
extraordinarily fast economic growth.  The Koreans have also 
followed a vigorous Japanese-type industrial policy - if anything, 
the policy has been even more interventionist than in Japan.  It 
has also been marked by a close relationship between the government 
and business. However, the nature of this relationship in Korea 
has been somewhat different than that in Japan.  Likewise, 
although there are broad similarities, there are also important 
differences between Japan and Korea with respect to (a) the 
organisation, ownership patterns and governance of the 
conglomerates in the two countries; (b) the respective financial 
systems; and (c) the industrial strategies.  The discussion below 
will attempt to highlight the differences. 
 
 
VI.1  Conglomerate organisation and the financial system in Korea 
 
The Korean industrialisation and catching up with advanced 
countries started in earnest in the early 1960s with the military 
coup by General Park Chung-Hee (later the President).  Park made 
economic development the top priority of his regime.  After an 
initial period of tension between the government and business, 
Park came to the view that the large private conglomerate 
businesses were to be the main vehicles for Korea's catch up 
(Amsden, 1994b).  
 
The government of Korea in its support of private business went 
one step further than the Japanese.  It actively helped create 
large conglomerates, promoting mergers and directing entry and 
exit of firms, according to the requirements of 
technological-scale economies and world-demand conditions.  The 
result is that the manufacturing industry of the country displays 
one of the highest levels of market concentration anywhere - 
whether among the developing or the developed economies.  The top 
50 chaebols accounted for 15 percent of GDP in 1990.  Among the 
largest 500 industrial companies in the world in 1990, there were 
11 firms from the Republic of Korea - the same number as from 
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Switzerland. UN (1993) observes in relation to the industrial 
structure of the Republic of Korea: 
 
Such a structure is the deliberate creation of the government, 
which utilised a highly interventionist strategy to push 
industry into larger-scale, complex technologically 
demanding activities while simultaneously restricting 
FDI inflows tightly to promote national ownership.  It 
was deemed necessary to create enterprises of large size 
and diversity, to undertake the risk inherent in 
launching high-technology, high-skill activities that 
would remain competitive in world markets.  The 
chaebols acted as the representative and spearheads of 
the government strategy: they were supported by 
protection against imports and TNC entry, subsidised 
credit, procurement preference and massive investments 
in education, infrastructure and science-technology 
network. 
 
There are some important differences between the Korean chaebol 
and the Japanese kieretsu.  In the Japanese kieretsu, there is 
a sharp divorce of ownership from control.  Although as noted in 
Section V, nearly three quarters of the shares in a kieretsu member 
firm may be held in "patient" hands of other stakeholders, there 
is, nevertheless, very little family share ownership and control. 
 In contrast, the Korean chaebol are to a considerable extent 
family owned and controlled.  The absence of family ownership 
means that the Japanese corporations are effectively run by 
professional managers.  The chaebol however, are run by the 
founding families who take the top management positions rather 
than professional managers.
26
 
 
The second crucial organizational difference between the chaebol 
and the kieretsu derives from the important differences in the 
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 Professionalisation of management is however gradually taking 
place in many chaebol.  See further Amsden (1989). 
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financial systems of the two countries.  The Korean financial 
system during the high growth period (1960-1980) was effectively 
under state control so that the relationship between the main bank 
and the "group" firms in Korea has been rather different from that 
in Japan.  In Japan, the group's main bank may be subject to 
government persuasion through "window guidance" etc. by the Bank 
of Japan, but it is nevertheless a private entity.  When the main 
bank is directly state owned and controlled as in Korea for much 
of the period, the relationship between the bank and the firms 
in the group becomes rather different.  The state-owned bank 
provides the government with an additional layer of control as 
well as information about the group's activities.  Lee (1992) has 
argued in defence of this kind of relationship between the 
financial system and the corporate organization, that the 
government and large private organizations together can be 
regarded as forming an internal capital market.  Following 
Williamson (1975), Lee suggests that such an internal system is 
not necessarily inefficient and can in fact be more effective than 
a free market financial system which suffers from various market 
imperfections. 
 
 
VI.2. Industrial strategy 
 
After a period of import substitution industrialisation in the 
1950s and 1960s, the Korean government embarked in the mid-1960s 
on a purposive strategy of promoting exports, whilst maintaining 
protection of its own market.  An essential purpose of this policy 
was to attain a current account equilibrium at as high a long-term 
growth rate of the economy as possible.  This task was more 
difficult for Korea than for Japan for two reasons.  First, Japan 
was relatively more developed than Korea. Secondly, Japan had a 
much larger internal market.  It is arguable whether or not 
Japanese economic growth during the high growth period was 
export-led (Tsuru, 1993).  The share of exports in GDP increased 
only to a small degree in the two decades 1953 to 1973, from 6.5 
percent in 1953 to 8.9 percent in 1973.  Korean industrialisation 
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on the other hand was definitely export-led.  In the comparable 
period of high growth in Korea, its exports increased from 4.8 
percent of GDP in 1963 to 34.0 percent in 1980 (Krueger, 1995). 
 
To achieve such export-led growth required stronger government 
involvement in building up the capabilities of private 
corporations to compete in the international market.  The 
government did this by a wide range of measures which helped the 
corporate sector to invest and to improve its technological 
development, as well as have the resources to finance these 
investment projects.  Some of the policies adopted by the 
government for these purposes are elaborated below. 
 
VI.3. Domestic and external competition27 
 
Contrary to a priori expectations as well as the experience of 
Japan during its high growth period, economic growth in Korea  
was not accompanied by declining concentration at either the 
industry or aggregate levels. This was due to the pattern of 
industrial expansion:  "Korea's growth in value added is due first 
to expansion of existing firms, second to entry of offspring firms, 
and only to a minor extent to net entrance of new entrepreneurs" 
(Jones and Sakong, 1980, p.176). 
 
The output of the top 5 and 10 business groups grew much faster 
than GNP, so that aggregate economic concentration rose 
spectacularly (Kim, 1987).  Korea's all-industry average 3-firm 
concentration ratio remained higher than Japan's --- 62% compared 
with 56.3% respectively (in the early 1980s) (Lee and Lee, 1990). 
Between 1970 and 1982 the share of total manufacturing shipments 
produced under a competitive market structure decreased from 
roughly 40% to 30%, while the share produced by oligopolies 
increased from 35% to 50% (Lee and Lee, 1990).
28
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 By 1987, however, the share of shipments in Korea produced under 
competitive market conditions did, in fact, rise, to 43%, while the share 
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Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that the big business groups 
still exhibited highly rivalrous behaviour (Kim, 1992). This was 
because under rapid growth conditions, as well as the rules of 
the game which the state had established, there was neither the 
incentive nor the ability for big business to collude.  The Korean 
government went out of its way to ensure that big business did 
not collude, by allocating subsidies only in exchange for strict 
performance standards (Amsden, 1989).  After 1975, inter-group 
competition in Korea heated-up as each chaebol tried to qualify 
for generous subsidies to establish a general trading company by 
meeting government performance standards regarding minimum export 
volume and number of export products (Cho, 1987). 
 
Although the Korean government disciplined subsidy recipients, 
it also supported them for lengthy periods until they ultimately 
became internationally competitive.  This enabled firms to have 
long time horizons for their investment plans. For example, in 
the Korean automobile industry, for 30 years no foreign cars were 
to be seen on Korean roads and no Korean cars were to be seen on 
foreign roads.  In the event, the industry's leader, the 90% 
locally-owned Hyundai Motor Company, became the first 
late-industrialising automobile maker to export to Europe and the 
United States (Amsden, 1989).   
 
 
VI.4. Inducement to invest and the socialisation of risk 
 
As in Japan, the government in Korea played a critical role in 
enhancing and maintaining at a high level the corporate inducement 
to invest.  However, the state in Korea was not just a referee 
or a ringmaster in orchestrating investment races, it was also 
a nursemaid and a fairy godmother to the chaebol.  During the 1970s 
                                                                
accounted for by oligopolies fell, to 40% (Lee and Lee, 1990).  This rise 
of competition cannot be attributed to anti-monopoly legislation, which 
was introduced in the 1980s but which was implemented only weakly and 
sporadically. Thus, as in Japan, rapid growth in Korea was accompanied 
ultimately by declining industry concentration.  
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when the government implemented its extremely ambitious "heavy 
and chemical industry" (HCI) program, it virtually became a 
co-partner with the leading chaebol and "socialised" the risks 
involved. 
 
These risks - both technological and market - in the production 
and sale of sophisticated new products were indeed formidable for 
the Korean private corporations.  Left to themselves, the private 
sector may not have undertaken these risky investments at all. 
 However, goaded by the government, provided with finance at 
subsidised rates through the nationalised banking system, the 
fiercely competitive top chaebol were more than willing to fully 
participate in these new ventures.  To illustrate, here is the 
story of the production of microwave ovens by the Korean company 
Samsung Industries, as told by an institution, the World Bank, 
not particularly known for its support of the state nurse-maiding 
of industrial production. 
 
The government's Economic Development Board was a key player 
in Samsung's success.  Government officials were keenly 
aware that the Republic of Korea could not rely forever 
on low wage manufacturing.  Just as the United States 
had lost countless textile industry jobs to Korea, they 
reasoned, so Korea would one day find it could no longer 
compete for labour-intensive manufacturing jobs with 
low-wage neighbours such as China and Indonesia.  To 
prepare for that day, government officials, working in 
consultation with the private sector, developed 
incentives for new knowledge- and capital-intensive 
industries.  Incentives varied widely and included the 
government's building industrial parks, subsidising 
utilities, giving tax rebates for exports, and making 
cheap loans for investment in new products.  By 1980, 
urged forward by subsidies and incentives, Korean 
industry had moved into steel, ships, and even cars and 
was about to leap into world class electronics. 
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Samsung made good use of these measures; company managers 
met frequently with government officials to trade ideas 
and projects.  Even so, penetrating the world microwave 
market dominated by Japan was no easy task.  By the late 
1970s, when global production hit 5 million per year, 
Samsung had made a total of only 1,460 microwave ovens. 
The company's first break came in 1980, when a US 
department store, looking for cheaper substitutes, 
ordered several thousand ovens.  Soon production had 
risen to 100,000.  When General Electric, unable to keep 
pace with the Japanese competition, decided to stop 
manufacturing microwaves itself and import the ovens 
under its own label instead, Samsung was a logical 
choice.  The company has never looked back, and it now 
exports the ovens under its own name as well as buyers' 
labels. (World Bank, 1993, pp. 130) 
 
Another important example of heavy state intervention in support 
of industry is provided by the recession of the early 1970s.  In 
view of the high leverage of Korean chaebol, the recession, coupled 
with devaluation and a rise in interest rates, threatened the 
financial viability of many strategic corporations engaged in HCI. 
 The government responded forcefully with the Presidential 
Emergency Decree of August 1972, which declared a moratorium on 
corporate debt to curb market lenders.  Kim, Shim and Kim (1995) 
note that all corporate loans from the curb market were converted 
into long-term loans to be paid on an instalment basis over a five 
year period with a grace period of three years.  A maximum interest 
rate of 16.2 percent was fixed on these loans while the prevailing 
curb market rate was over 40 percent per annum.   
 
Korea's HCI drive is often criticized by orthodox economists (see 
World Bank, 1993; Krueger, 1995) as an example of inefficiency 
and waste and general government failure.  However, this 
assessment is disputed by many economists who point out that there 
were inevitable teething troubles with a highly ambitious program 
of this kind designed to fundamentally transform the structure 
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of the Korean economy.  On a long-term view, HCI can be regarded 
as being exceptionally valuable as since the mid-1980s it has been 
the main source of Korea's outstanding export success in the world 
markets (Amsden, 1989; Kim, Shim and Kim, 1995).  Moreover, the 
latter three authors also suggest that HCI expanded the spectrum 
of the product mix in the economy and provided domestic producers 
enormous scope for learning by doing.  They believe that the Korean 
experience confirms the Lucas (1993) hypothesis that the quicker 
the introduction of new products, the quicker the process of 
learning by doing and the faster the overall expansion of the 
economy.  Kim, Shim and Kim conclude that the government's active 
risk sharing with private firms made an important contribution 
to the successful implementation of the HCI program. 
 
 
VI.5. The financing of corporate growth in Korea 
 
Table 11 provides comparative information on the financing of 
corporate growth for four industrial countries - the U.S., the 
U.K., Germany and Japan - and for Korea.  The table is based on 
aggregate flow of funds accounts and refers to the non-financial 
corporate sector as a whole.  The figures for the industrial 
countries refers to the period 1970 to 1989 and for Korea for the 
years 1975 to 1990.  There are serious deficiencies of data in 
making such international comparisons, but as far as possible a 
broadly similar methodology has been used for the decomposition 
of the sources of finance for all five countries in table 11.  
It would have perhaps been more useful to compare the Korean pattern 
of financing corporate growth with that of other semi-industrial 
countries, but unfortunately the lack of comparable flow of funds 
data prevents such an exercise. 
 
Table 11 shows that the Korean pattern of financing of corporate 
growth is much more similar to that of Japan than that of the other 
three industrial countries.  The Korean corporations finance an 
even smaller proportion of their growth from retained earnings 
than the Japanese companies.  The Korean companies also rely to 
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a greater extent on new equity finance than companies in the U.K. 
or the U.S. where one might have thought a priori that stock market 
financing would be more important.  The results of table 11 conform 
to the conclusions reached by Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh 
(1995b) that large developing country corporations rely to a 
greater extent on a) external finance, and b) on equity finance 
than advanced country corporations. 
 
The greater reliance on external finance by developing countries 
is not difficult to explain: given their much faster growth rates, 
the developing country corporations need both more internal and 
external funds to finance their growth. Indeed, Cho (1995) reports 
for Korea a consistent negative relationship between internal 
finance and loan finance, suggesting that the lower the level of 
internal finance, the greater the "need" for companies to finance 
its investment program from outside sources.  The greater reliance 
on equity financing of the Korean than of the advanced country 
corporations is a more complex subject which is not directly  
relevant to the purpose of the present paper.  This issue is, 
however, fully examined in Singh (1995b). 
 
 
VI.6. Profits, savings and investment at the macroeconomic level 
 
We have seen above that the Korean corporate sector relied heavily 
on external sources (mainly banks) to finance its growth.  It is 
also clear from the previous discussion that at the microeconomic 
level, the Korean chaebol were not motivated by short term 
profitability but rather by their desire to maintain and improve 
the market share.  It will be recalled from Section V that the 
Japanese firms behaved in a similar way, but the factors which 
were responsible for inducing such firm motivation were somewhat 
different in the Japanese case as compared with that of Korean 
firms.  In Korea, the state played a much more overt and visible 
role in influencing firm motivation and behaviour. 
 
We shall now examine the role of profits in the Korean economy 
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at the macroeconomic level and consider how these might have 
contributed towards meeting the macroeconomic constraint of the 
equality of ex ante savings and investments at high growth rates. 
 Table 12 provides information on the gross share of profits in 
gross production as well as aggregate profit rates for the Korean 
manufacturing industry over the last three decades.  
Unfortunately similar data is not available for other 
semi-industrial countries to permit a comparative exercise. 
 
Two important points emerge from table 12.   First, the Korean 
profit share in the 1960s and the 1970s was very high - averaging 
well over 40 percent in both decades.  These figures for both 
profit share and profit rates for two decades are similar to those 
of Japan during that country's high growth period.  Secondly, we 
note a trend decline in both profit rates and profit shares in 
Korea after 1978.  Between 1977 and 1987, average profit share 
declined by at least 5 percentage points.  There appears to have 
been a further sharper decline since 1987. 
 
Table 13 provides information on sectoral savings and investment 
ratios for Korea and a small group of other countries in Asia and 
Latin America for which flow of funds accounts are available.  
In considering this data, it must be born in mind that they are 
subject to serious statistical deficiencies.  Moreover the data 
does not pertain to exactly the same period for each country.  
For example the Indian figures are averaged over the period 1970- 
1982, the Chinese cover the years 1982 - 1986, Thailand 1981 - 
1983, and Columbia 1970 - 1986.  Nevertheless, these are the best 
comparable data on sectoral savings and investment behaviour 
available for LDCs and they do provide some useful insights. 
 
The table reveals the following main points.  First business 
investment as a proportion of GNP was greater in Korea than in any 
other country except China.  In general, Malaysia and Thailand also 
recorded greater business investment ratios than the two Latin 
American countries in the sample - Colombia and Ecuador.  Second, 
if we turn to savings, we again find that business savings in China, 
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Korea, Thailand and Malaysia were considerably greater in 
proportionate terms than those in Colombia and Ecuador. Thirdly, 
the data show that in terms of household savings, the Korean record 
was no better than that of India and the Philippines and not at 
all that different from Colombia and Ecuador.  So unlike the case 
of Japan, which it will be recalled from Section V had greater 
sectoral savings ratios for each of the three sectors relative to 
other industrial countries, the Korean superiority in relation to 
other developing countries is marked only with respect to business 
investment and business savings.  It is also noticeable that 
although business savings in Korea are high in comparative 
international terms, these can finance only 40% of business 
investment; the rest of the finance has to be mobilised from the 
other sectors. 
 
 
VII.  Summing Up 
 
The last two sections have examined in some detail the accumulation 
process in the two exemplary East Asian economies both at the micro 
and macro-economic levels.  Particular attention has been paid here 
to (a) the role of the government and government-business 
interactions; and (b) the relationship between the financial system 
and the corporation. These relationships have been crucial for 
raising and maintaining at a high level the corporate propensity 
to invest in East Asian countries during their high growth phases.
29
 
Our analysis has also emphasised the role of the government in 
ensuring high corporate and overall profits in order to satisfy 
inter alia the macroeconomic constraint on savings and investment. 
As Akyuz and Gore (1996) note: "...in this way, East Asian NIEs 
have been able to avoid the kind of problems associated with 
Soviet-type investments not based on profits, as well as the Latin 
American phenomenon of profits without investment".  
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 For an analysis of government-business interactions in Taiwan and 
for their role in raising the corporate propensity to invest, see Rodrik 
(1995). 
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VIII. Implications for Development Thinking 
 
We now bring together the threads of the previous discussion in 
order to examine its implications for development thinking and 
practice.  The next section will consider what useful policy 
lessons, if any, can be drawn from this analysis for the Latin 
American countries in the context of the new global economic order. 
 
With regard to development thinking, the first point which emerges 
from this paper concerns the role of large domestically owned third 
world firms in economic development. This subject has received very 
little attention in the literature. The literature emphasises 
capital accumulation but studies it by and large at a macroeconomic 
level.  The question of investment allocation is indeed examined 
at a microeconomic level, but it is done within the context of 
cost-benefit analysis of investment projects. However, economists 
have been slow to recognise the fact that industrialisation and 
development are actually carried out by firms, organisations and 
managements. We have not so far begun to develop an analytical 
perspective on the nature and role of these entities in carrying 
out industrial development. There is no theory of the third world 
firm.  Is a large third world firm much like a large firm in the 
advanced countries or are there important differences between the 
two?   
 
To illustrate the significance of this point it is useful to draw 
attention to Aoki's (1990) work on the differences between Japanese 
and Anglo-Saxon firms.  Aoki has emphasised the differences between 
the two groups of firms with respect to (a) their relationship with 
their workers; (b) their respective managerial cultures; (c) 
relationships with the providers of finance; (d) relationships with 
their suppliers and sub-contractors; (e) their respective ownership 
patterns.  He has formalised these differences into a distinct 
theory of the  Japanese firm. 
 
There are indeed very important differences between large 
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third-world firms and those in the US and Western Europe both today 
and in the past when these countries themselves were 
industrialising. It is a remarkable fact that the large private 
sector third-world firms tend to be highly diversified industrial 
groups operating in a number of unrelated fields, i.e. they are 
what might be called "irrational" conglomerates. This kind of 
'group' business organisation seems to have arisen in countries 
with diverse cultures, institutions and historical development. 
Such widely diversified groups comprise the leading firms in India, 
Korea, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and many other countries. Of the 
31 largest private industrial enterprises in the semi-industrial 
countries in 1987, 27 were diversified groups which were mostly 
family controlled (Amsden and Hikino, 1994). 
 
The large third world firms have been increasing their share of 
world output.  In 1962 there were only four third world firms - 
two from South Africa, one from India and one from Turkey among 
the five hundred largest industrial enterprises in the world.  By 
1992 this number had risen to thirty three.  It included twelve 
Korean companies whereas in 1962 there was not a single company 
from that country among the top five hundred.
30
 
 
The special characteristics of contemporary giant third-world firms 
need systematic investigation. How for example, do large Latin 
American "groups" differ from Asian "groups". Is it true that, as 
some students suggest, in the typical Latin American "group", 
corporations control the group bank, while it is the other way round 
in East Asia?  
 
Secondly, the main part of the paper has provided an analysis of 
the high corporate rates of savings and investment in East Asian 
economic development.  Apart from its own interest, this emphasis 
is also significant for another important analytical and policy 
reason.  It will be recalled that the recently concluded Uruguay 
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Round Agreements have, in addition to trade liberalization, also 
extended multilateral rules and disciplines to a number of policy 
areas affecting industrial development and competitiveness with 
regard to both goods and services.  Such policies -- generally 
defined as industrial policies -- have been extensively used in 
the past, notably by fast growing East Asian countries, to foster 
exports and to achieve rapid structural change and economic growth.  
 
However, a number of these policies will fall foul of the Agreements, 
particularly in respect to provisions on trade related investment 
measures (TRIMS) (See further Singh, 1996).  This could seriously 
handicap developing countries who wish to emulate the example of 
the successful East Asian economies.   
 
There is however a way out of this predicament. This is because 
even though the post-Uruguay Round trading regime may restrict the 
use of a number of instruments of industrial policy with respect 
to the promotion of exports and the control of imports, it does 
not regulate government policies towards domestic savings and 
investments. In analytical terms, the focus on raising the 
propensities to save and invest can be regarded as an alternative 
way of enhancing a country’s long term international 
competitiveness.  
 
Historically, the East Asian governments have promoted 
international competitiveness by following both sets of policies 
simultaneously - i.e. the normal industrial and commercial policies 
with respect to exports and imports as well as policies which enhance 
savings and investments.  Pursuing complementary means to attain 
the same ends would appear to be the optimal policy stance for even 
if one set of measures do not fully succeed, the others may work 
better and help reach the target.  However, if the WTO regime 
effectively rules out over time traditional industrial policy, the 
other policy measures acting on the propensities to save and invest, 
can by themselves, still promote technical change and international 
competitiveness. This will particularly be so for the more developed 
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of the industrialising countries, for example, Malaysia, Korea, 
or Thailand. 
 
Thirdly, another implication of the analysis of savings, investment 
and profits in this paper for development thinking concerns income 
and wealth distribution.  As noted earlier a striking aspect of 
the success of the exemplar East Asian countries is that they have 
been able to achieve fast economic growth while maintaining a 
relatively equal distribution of income. However, an important 
question is what has happened to wealth distribution? It is well 
known that in Japan and Korea, the land reform under US auspices 
led to a relatively equal initial distribution of income and wealth. 
However, in the subsequent industrialisation of these countries, 
corporate profits, savings and investment increased enormously. 
Industrial concentration may not have increased but it has remained 
high (Amsden and Singh, 1994). One would expect in these 
circumstances that, other things being equal, the wealth 
distribution in the urban economy will become more unequal. UNCTAD 
(1994) suggests that there is indirect evidence that this is what 
has actually happened. If so, this may require revision of political 
economy interpretations which are extant and which assume that 
neither income nor wealth distribution has worsened in East Asian 
economies.
31
 
 
The question of wealth distribution in these countries therefore 
requires systematic research. If the wealth distribution, despite 
high corporate profits, savings and investments, did not become 
more unequal over time, what market or non-market mechanisms 
prevented that?  If it did become more unequal, what are its 
implications for the political economy of these countries?  In 
principle it is quite possible that even if there is no trade-off 
between growth and income inequality there may well be one between 
growth and wealth inequality. 
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IX. Lessons for Latin America? 
 
I turn now to the more difficult question: what are the lessons 
of the East Asian story for Latin American countries?  Can the Latin 
Americans learn anything from the East Asians on, for example, how 
to improve their corporate savings and investment record?  This 
is a complex issue because although the lessons of the East Asian 
experience are clear enough, there does not appear to be the 
appropriate political conjuncture for Latin Americans to be willing 
either to heed such advice or to learn from that experience. 
 
This Latin American political conjuncture, whereby most governments 
in the region are in one form or another following the Washington 
Consensus and abandoning long-held dirigiste policies, coincides 
with a broader movement in the world economy towards liberalisation 
and globalisation.  In this overall context, the following points 
in relation to the relevance of the East Asian experience for Latin 
America seem to me to be significant. 
 
First, it is clear that the successful East Asian countries have 
not followed the "market friendly" approach as enunciated in its 
classic form in World Bank (1991).  In order to prevent the concept 
from being a mere tautology, the Report, to its credit, defined 
market friendly fairly precisely: a) intervene reluctantly, b) 
apply checks and balances, and c) intervene openly.  As is evident 
from the discussion in this paper as well as from much scholarship 
in this area
32
, the East Asian governments did not intervene 
reluctantly: rather, they pursued vigorous and purposeful 
industrial policies.
33
  Nor did they intervene openly or 
transparently as evidenced by the widespread use of administrative 
guidance.  They did, however, apply checks and balances in the form 
                     
    
32
 See Amsden (1989); Wade (1990); Singh (1995a, 1995b). 
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  There is a dispute about the effectiveness of industrial policy, 
but most economists accept (including World Bank (1993)) that such 
dirigiste policies were actually implemented by the successful East Asian 
states. 
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of performance standards (notably with respect to exports) in return 
for subsidies and other government concessions.  In relation to 
corporate investment and savings, the government again, as seen 
in previous sections, had a major role in raising and maintaining 
at a high level the corporate propensity to invest.  It used, inter 
alia, trade, financial and competition policies to create "rents"  
which boosted corporate profits, but it also took steps to ensure 
that these rents were not consumed but were translated into 
investment.  With the blessings of the government, if not its 
outright control, the financial system worked in such a way that 
the managers were able to pursue long-term investment strategies 
rather than being constrained by short-term goals of profitability 
and earnings per share.  Thus, these prolonged high corporate 
investment rates which have been critical to East Asian growth were 
not simply the result of getting the macroeconomic fundamentals 
right and in achieving low and stable inflation but rather the 
outcome of a visible process of government intervention. 
 
 
Secondly, in the current context of liberalisation and 
globalisation, the East Asians have been reluctant liberalizers. 
Contrary to the Bretton Woods Institutions, the East Asian countries 
during the last three decades have not sought close integration 
with the world economy but rather what I have called elsewhere a 
"strategic integration" - i.e. they have integrated up to the point 
and in the spheres where it was in their interest to do so.  Thus, 
they have traditionally been open with respect to exports but not 
so open with respect to imports.  It was noted in the introduction 
to this essay that by the year 2000 South Korea is expected to become 
the fourth largest car producer in the world.  Even now it has 
sizeable exports to the United States and Western Europe and yet 
in 1995 the country imported only 4,000 cars.  Although somewhat 
self-serving, many students of the Japanese economy would endorse 
the following recent complaint
34
 from the Federation of Swedish 
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Industries concerning the "Asian way" of doing business: 
 
...it is necessary to face the new challenges presented to 
the present international trading system by "the Asian 
way" of regulation and of business.  So far this 
challenge has been encountered mainly in relation to 
Japan, which has adhered to (almost) every letter in the 
GATT agreement, and at the same time managed to circumvent 
the spirit of the agreement by maintaining various formal 
and informal non-tariff barriers to imports, which have 
resulted in continued large surpluses.  Only recently 
have these barriers begun to be dismantled, but the 
surplus is still large.  These barriers combined with 
structural surpluses have shaken the confidence of the 
general public and of many economic operators in the 
fairness of the system, and contributed to continuous 
and rising pressures for increased protection in Europe 
and in North America from sectors which feel hurt by such 
policies.  We also see the Koreans and the Chinese 
emulating important parts of the Japanese practices, 
while the records of South East Asian nations are more 
mixed.
35
 
 
The East Asians have similarly been less than forthcoming in 
implementing financial liberalisation. 
 
Thirdly, both in relation to trade and financial liberalisation, 
the contrast between the East Asian and the Latin American countries 
could not be more striking. The Latin Americans have 
enthusiastically reduced tariffs and trade barriers as well as 
capital controls.
36
  The central issue is: will the liberalisation 
experiment succeed in terms of evoking an adequate supply response? 
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Although the jury is still out, so far the evidence is not very 
favourable to the Washington Consensus.  Despite the huge capital 
inflows in the 1990s, the Latin American growth rate in the first 
half of the decade has only been about 3 percent per annum.  This 
is roughly half the long term rate (6% p.a. between 1965 and 1980, 
see Table 1) achieved in the bad old days of dirigiste policies. 
 
More importantly it is also coincidentally less than half the rate 
required, on past statistical relationships, to provide 
remunerative employment for just the new entrants to the fast 
growing Latin American labour forces.
37
  Similarly, in relation 
to corporate profits and investment, Palma (1996) reports for a 
sample of six Latin American countries for which he had comparable 
data that the share of profits in GNP in these economies increased 
by ten percentage points (from 50 to 60 percent) with the recovery 
that started in 1987.  However, corporate savings and investment 
hardly increased at all.  There is also evidence that the commodity 
composition of Latin American exports is moving in the adverse 
direction, i.e. towards those products where world demand is 
expected to grow slowly.
38
 
 
It would appear to an observer of Asian economic development that 
the precipitate and uncontrolled trade liberalisation which 
occurred in Latin America in the 1980s was probably not well-timed. 
It took place when Latin American industry was competitively weak 
because of the low levels of investment during the course of the 
debt crisis.  However, the situation seems to have been made doubly 
difficult for the real economy in many countries by the financial 
liberalisation which has been implemented towards the end of the 
last decade.  In the wake of the financial crisis which overwhelmed 
Mexico in December 1994, Latin American economies have already paid 
a heavy price for this liberalisation in terms of loss of output. 
Further, stock markets have played a key role in the internal and 
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external financial liberalisation process which has taken place. 
 
Apart from the macroeconomic effects of financial liberalisation, 
it is arguable that the consequent growing hegemony of the stock 
market in these economies may at the microeconomic level hinder 
rather than help industrialisation and economic growth.  Long ago 
Keynes observed (Keynes, 1936, p. 139) that " when the capital 
development of a country becomes the by-product of the activities 
of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done."  The enormous 
fluctuations on the Latin American stock markets in the recent 
period unrelated to any fundamentals,
39
 would appear to confirm 
Keynes' characterisation of such markets as casinos.  Even if the 
Latin American industry can bear the burden of trade liberalisation, 
the cross of financial liberalisation may be crippling.
40
 
 
However, as noted earlier, the jury on the supply response and the 
real economy is still out. If adequate supply response continues 
to be elusive, at what point will the architects of the Washington 
consensus be willing to admit that the experiment has failed? 
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